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Abstract
The climate response to anthropogenic forcing has long been one of the
dominant uncertainties in predicting future climate change (Houghton et al.,
2001). Many observationally-based estimates of climate sensitivity (S) have
been presented in recent years, with most of them assigning significant prob-
ability to extremely high sensitivity, such as P (S > 6C) > 5%.
However, closer examination reveals that these estimates are based on a num-
ber of implausible implicit assumptions. We explain why these estimates can-
not be considered credible and therefore have no place in the decision-making
process. In fact, when basic probability theory is applied and reasonable as-
sumptions are made, much greater confidence in a moderate value for S
(≃ 2.5C) is easily justified, with S very unlikely to be as high as 4.5C.
1 Introduction
The response of the climate system to anthropogenic forcing, traditionally
expressed as the equilibrium sensitivity (S) of the globally-averaged tem-
perature to a doubling of the atmospheric concentration of CO2, has long
been considered as having great significance in terms of our understanding of
the climate system. A number of estimates have been presented over recent
decades, perhaps the most famous being the statement of Charney (1979)
that S was unlikely to lie outside the range of 1.5-4.5C, with that statement
later formally presented as representing a probability somewhere in the range
of 66-90% (Houghton et al., 2001). More recently, a proliferation of proba-
bilistic estimates explicitly based on calculations using observational data
have also been presented (eg Andronova & Schlesinger, 2001; Gregory et al.,
2002; Forest et al., 2002; Hegerl et al., 2006). Many of these results suggest
a worryingly high probability of high sensitivity, such as P (S > 6) > 5%.
The focus of this paper is to discuss how credible such estimates are.
To avoid possible misunderstandings, we establish at the outset that the
notion of probability discussed here is the standard Bayesian paradigm of
probability as the subjective degree of belief of the researcher in a proposi-
tion (Bernardo & Smith, 1994). While this is not the only possible paradigm
for the treatment of epistemic uncertainty in climate science (eg Kriegler,
2005), it appears to be the dominant one. The main (perhaps sole) reason
for interest in such estimates is in order to support decision making, such
as mitigation and adaptation strategies (eg Yohe et al., 2004; Meinshausen,
2006). In order for decisions made in the face of uncertainty to be rational,
they must conform to the probability calculus (de Finetti, 1974–5), which in-
ter alia mandates the application of Bayes’ Theorem for updating beliefs in
the light of evidence: f(S|O) = f(O|S)f(S)/f(O), where f(S|O) represents
the posterior probability density function (pdf) for sensitivity S after taking
account of a set of observations O, f(S) represents the prior belief in the ab-
sence of these observations, f(O|S) is the likelihood function which describes
how the observations are probabilistically dependent on the sensitivity, and
f(O) is a normalisation factor. Beliefs which do not conform to the proba-
bility calculus are said to be incoherent, and are vulnerable to a Dutch Book
argument. That is, is it possible to construct a sequence of decisions (bets),
each one of which appears to be rational in the light of the stated beliefs,
but which collectively ensure a loss under all possible outcomes. A simple
example will be presented later.
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In order to calculate f(S|O), two inputs are required: the prior f(S), and
the likelihood f(O|S) which depends on the observations which are used. We
consider these two inputs in turn in the next two sections, and follow with
some conclusions.
2 The prior
2.1 “Ignorant” priors
If the posterior pdf is intended to represent the beliefs of the researcher con-
cerning climate sensitivity after updating via a particular set of observations
O, then the prior must logically represent their beliefs in the absence of
these observations. Note that this does not actually require a chronological
relationship between prior, observations, and posterior, although such a re-
lationship may exist. Determining a suitable prior is potentially challenging
given that in many or even most cases, the researcher is already aware of
the broad implications of the data before the detailed quantitative analysis
is undertaken. It is important to be aware of the risk of double-counting the
data by accounting for it both in the prior and again through the likelihood,
as committing this error would result in over-confident estimates.
In an attempt to avoid that risk, researchers have often chosen to use a
uniform prior, which is sometimes described as ”ignorant”. However, it must
be recognised that in fact there can be no prior that actually represents a state
of true ignorance regarding S. For example, any proper prior cannot avoid
assigning a specific level of belief to the proposition that S > 6C. Further-
more, the uniform priors which have been used represent beliefs that in our
opinion are difficult to justify. The uniform prior U[0C,20C] (Frame et al.,
2005) actually represents a prior belief that S is “likely” (70% probability)
greater than 6C, with an expected value for S of 10C and a 50% probability
of exceeding this value. Even when truncated to U[0C,10C] (Hegerl et al.,
2006), such a uniform prior still represents the belief that P (S > 6C) = 40%,
and furthermore that S is more than twice as likely to lie outside the con-
ventional 1.5-4.5C “likely” range, as inside it. The notion that such priors
can encapsulate the concept of ignorance may be superficially attractive but
is surely not defensible in detail.
For illustration, we consider the ERBE data which were recently analysed
by Forster & Gregory (2006). This analysis has several attractive features
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which we discuss later. For now, it is sufficient to note that their analy-
sis results in a likelihood which is Gaussian in feedback L = 1/S, which is
broadly similar in shape to the marginal likelihood functions for sensitiv-
ity that have been obtained from a variety of investigations including those
cited above. There are fundamental physical reasons for this which are well
understood (Hansen et al., 1985).
A Gaussian in likelihood space has the unfortunate property that f(O|L =
0) is strictly greater than zero, and therefore for all large S, f(O|S) is
bounded below by a constant. Therefore, if the improper unbounded uniform
prior is used, no proper posterior pdf results. This necessitates the selection
of bounds on the uniform prior — it would therefore be more appropriate to
label it as “a” uniform prior — and the results are strongly dependent on
the upper bound selected. Figure 1 shows results obtained using three differ-
ent uniform priors: U[0,10] (Hegerl et al., 2006), U[0,20] (Frame et al., 2005)
and an arbitrarily extended range of U[0,50]. In all cases, the likelihood is
identical. That is, the difference in results here is entirely due to the choice of
upper bound on the prior, rather than the observations. It would, we argue,
be difficult to claim that any one of these choices was a more objective basis
for decision making in preference to the other two, or other possible upper
bounds. However, the posterior 95% probability threshold is remarkably dif-
ferent between these three results, as is P (S > 6C). Choosing between these
three (or other) alternatives could be expected to have strong implications
for policy decisions.
It has even been suggested that a general method for probabilistic estima-
tion can be established by choosing the prior to be uniform in the variable
which is being estimated (Frame et al., 2005). In addition to the need to
choose bounds (for which no rationale has been presented), an even more
fundamental problem with this approach is that it generates inconsistent
results which do not conform to the probability calculus. Consider a single
observation X
o
of an unknown variable X , which takes the value X
o
= 2 with
an observational uncertainty of 0.5 (assumed to be the standard deviation of
a Gaussian deviate). If we wish to estimate both X and Z = X4, then the
proposal of Frame et al. (2005) is that we should perform these estimations
using a uniform prior in each variable in turn, which would generate the re-
sults that P (X > 3) = 2.3% but P (Z > 81) = P (X4 > 34) = 7.8%. Since
both propositions are logically equivalent, assigning different probabilities to
them is a clear indication of incoherence. At the risk of belabouring the
point, a Dutch Book can be constructed by noting that the first probability
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implies the acceptability of a bet which requires a stake of 0.97 (in units of
utility) and which pays out 1 in return iff X < 3, and the second probability
implies a willingness to stake 0.07 on a bet which pays 1 iff Z > 81. Col-
lectively, the total stake is 1.04 and the return is only 1 irrespective of the
actual outcome. It seems doubtful whether such an unconventional approach
to probability can have a useful role to play in the decision making process.
Moreover, unless the set of data O under explicit consideration actually
include all of the evidence which might be considered relevant to the estima-
tion of climate sensitivity, it is not even appropriate for the prior to represent
“ignorance” at all. Instead, it should represent the background beliefs in the
absence of O. Therefore, it seems clear there is no alternative but to attempt
the task of selecting a prior that does in fact honestly represent the prior be-
liefs of the researcher — that is, what they would believe in the absence of
the data under examination. If confidence about the choice of such a prior
is low, then a sensible response would be to test the sensitivity of the overall
results to a range of reasonable choices, rather than abandon any attempt to
undertake this estimation at all.
2.2 Expert priors
One way to attempt to formulate a more credible prior would be to look
back through the literature, to see what climate scientists actually wrote
prior to the analysis of modern data sets. After Arrhenius (1896)’s early es-
timate of around 5C, all subsequent model-based estimates have been clearly
lower (Manabe & Wetherald, 1967; Hansen et al., 1983), culminating in the
“likely” range of 1.5–4.5C (Charney, 1979). This is still well before any mod-
ern probabilistic analysis of the warming trend and much other data, and so
could be considered a sensible basis for a credible prior. Simple physically-
based arguments also point towards a modest value as at least having higher
probability than extremes. For example, the radiative forcing effect of CO2
alone is estimated to be roughly 1C, with water vapour feedback doubling
this to 2C (Houghton et al., 2001). Cloud feedback is widely acknowledged
to be highly uncertain, but a prior of U[0C,20C] requires the belief that not
only it is “very likely” (90%) positive, but furthermore likely to be large.
We emphasise that we do not propose that such simplistic arguments can
provide a precise estimate for S, or even that they justify the selection of
a prior that completely prohibits high values. Rather, we merely use them
to support our claim that the uniform priors which have been widely used
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represent an extreme viewpoint which cannot be reconciled with actual prior
scientific opinion. Returning to overtly subjective expert opinions, a com-
posite expert prior has also been presented (Webster & Sokolov, 2002), based
on a survey of experts (Morgan & Keith, 1995), which is also broadly con-
sistent with the long-held viewpoint that S is likely to be moderate. It has
already been shown by Forest et al. (2002) that updating this expert prior
with global temperature data from the 20th century results in greatly in-
creased confidence in a moderate value for S. It is, however, hard to shake off
the accusation that the experts who were surveyed in this case were aware of
the recent warming rate, and had therefore already accounted for that data
in their estimates. However, such an accusation can hardly remain credible
if instead of using this historical temperature data, we consider the recent
analysis of the ERBE data, which was only published more than 10 years af-
ter the survey (and note further that the raw observational data upon which
the analysis was based entirely post-dates the Charney report so cannot pos-
sibly have influenced this assessment). We therefore update the expert prior
with the likelihood function arising from the ERBE data, and present the
results in Figure 2. The resulting 5-95% posterior probability interval is
1.2-3.6C. This result is remarkably insensitive to reasonable changes in the
prior. As a demonstration of this, we use an alternative prior with greatly
exaggerated tails, also illustrated in Figure 2. This has the functional shape
f(S) ∝ 1/((S − 2.5)2 + 3), truncated at 0C and 20C. This prior assigns sub-
stantially higher (and rather worrying) probabilities to extreme S, such as
P (S > 6C) = 15% and P (S > 10C) = 5%, and only 57% probability to S
lying in the traditional range of 1.5-4.5C. We suspect that if such an estimate
had been presented in the Charney report, it would have been met with a
mixture of widespread scepticism and alarm. Even in this case, however, the
posterior 5-95% probability range only widens to 1.3-4.2C. Such a result still
represents a substantial improvement on all recent estimates. Furthermore,
it can hardly be argued that this prior rules out high S a priori, it merely
assigns a substantial rather than extraordinarily high level of prior belief
to such a hypothesis. For example, if the data actually indicated a strong
likelihood for high sensitivity (say via a hypothetical likelihood function for
radiative feedback given by L=N(0.4,0.1), which has maximum likelihood at
S=3.7/0.4=9.2C) then the posterior would have a 5-95% probability range
of 6.4-14.3C. Therefore, it is clear that the choice of such a prior in no way
prevents the posterior from indicating a high probability of high sensitivity,
if the data were to actually suggest this.
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3 The data
As well as the choice of prior, the choice of observations O is a crucial
component in the analysis. Most researchers have only considered small
sets of specific observations in isolation, such as globally-averaged tempera-
ture and forcing data (Andronova & Schlesinger, 2001; Gregory et al., 2002;
Forest et al., 2002), or the short-term cooling following a specific volcanic
eruption (Wigley et al., 2005). By returning to a uniform prior for the anal-
ysis of each new data set, it has proved possible to state that those specific
data do not by themselves provide a good upper bound on S. However, this
divide-and-conquer strategy cannot, by construction, generate probabilities
that represent the beliefs of scientists who are aware of all (or even much)
of the relevant data, and therefore has no direct value to decision-makers.
If observations are not explicitly considered in the likelihood function, then
they must be accounted for in the prior. More data can certainly be expected
to reduce uncertainty, and it has been recently shown that substantial im-
provements can be expected from such an approach (Annan & Hargreaves,
2006; Hegerl et al., 2006). We note that both of these analyses above were
actually based on an underlying uniform prior, which implies that a more
appropriate choice might have generated somewhat stronger results. There
may be legitimate arguments about the conditional independence of various
data from different analyses (especially when the analyses all require the use
of a complex climate model which may introduce persistent biases), although
there does not appear to be any meaningful discussion of this in the litera-
ture to date. The analysis of ERBE data seems particularly useful in this
respect, since it is based on a direct regression analysis of satellite obser-
vations of radiation versus recent surface temperature data, and does not
depend on climate models, (or even, say, the rate of heat diffusion into the
ocean or the overall surface warming trend) in the generation of the likeli-
hood function. Therefore, there can be little question over its independence
from the prior estimates which we have discussed, or pdfs which have been
published based on other data. Combining the ERBE analysis with the pdfs
of Annan & Hargreaves (2006) and Hegerl et al. (2006) noticeably sharpens
their results, with an upper 95% probability threshold of no more than 4C
in each case.
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4 Conclusions
If we are to act rationally based on probabilistic calculations, then it is es-
sential to ensure that these decisions are based on credible analyses of the
available evidence. By both choosing a uniform prior (which by construction
assigns very high probability to high climate sensitivity), and also ignoring
almost all data which would moderate this belief, researchers have generated
a number of results which assign high probability to extremely high climate
sensitivity. We have explained here why this approach is fundamentally un-
sound, and cannot be considered to plausibly represent the rational beliefs
of informed climate scientists. If we use either one (let alone both) of (a) a
plausible prior, even one which assigns substantial (but not extraordinary)
belief to high climate sensitivity, and (b) a somewhat more comprehensive
analysis of multiple data sets, then the “fat tail” of high sensitivity disap-
pears, with an upper 95% probability limit easily shown to lie close to 4C,
and certainly well below 6C. These results are very robust with respect to
realistic choices for the prior. Evidence arising from the analysis of observa-
tions can be considered either explicitly as part of the analysis, or implicitly
in the prior, but cannot be arbitrarily ignored without disqualifying the re-
sulting analysis from any claim to represent a credible belief. In the light of
this analysis, it is difficult to see how a belief in a significant probability of
very high climate sensitivity can be rationally sustained.
References
Andronova, N. G. & M. E. Schlesinger, 2001: Objective estimation of the
probability density function for climate sensitivity, Journal of Geophysical
Research, 108(D8), 22,605–22,611.
Annan, J. D. & J. C. Hargreaves, 2006: Using multiple observationally-based
constraints to estimate climate sensitivity, Geophysical Research Letters,
33(L06704).
Arrhenius, S., 1896: On the influence of carbonic acid in the air upon the
temperature of the ground, Philosophical Magazine, 41, 237–276.
Bernardo, J. & A. Smith, 1994: Bayesian Theory, Wiley, Chichester, UK.
7
Figure 1: Effect of using different bounds on a uniform prior. Solid black
line indicates likelihood function of Forster & Gregory (2006). Dashed
coloured lines show the priors, solid coloured curves are cumulative poste-
rior pdfs and dotted lines indicate upper 95% probability threshold. Red:
U[0,10] (Hegerl et al., 2006),blue: U[0,20] (Frame et al., 2005), magenta:
U[0,50]
8
Figure 2: Pdfs arising from expert priors. Solid black line indicates likelihood
function of Forster & Gregory (2006). Dashed coloured lines show the priors,
solid coloured curves are cumulative posterior pdfs and dotted lines indicate
upper 95% probability threshold. Red: Expert prior of Webster & Sokolov
(2002), cyan: extended high tail (see text) blue: U[0,20]
9
Charney, J. G., 1979: Carbon Dioxide and Climate: A Scientific Assessment,
NAS, Washington D.C.
de Finetti, B., 1974–5: Theory of Probability (2 vols), Wiley, New York.
Forest, C. E., P. H. Stone, A. P. Sokolov, M. R. Allen & M. D. Webster,
2002: Quantifying uncertainties in climate system properties with the use
of recent climate observations, Science, 295(5552), 113–117.
Forster, P. M. & J. M. Gregory, 2006: The climate sensitivity and its com-
ponents diagnosed from earth radiation budget data, Journal of Climate,
19(1), 39–52.
Frame, D. J., B. B. B. Booth, J. A. Kettleborough, D. A. Stainforth, J. M.
Gregory, M. Collins & M. R. Allen, 2005: Constraining climate forecasts:
The role of prior assumptions, Geophysical Research Letters, 32(L09702).
Gregory, J. M., R. J. Stouffer, S. C. B. Raper, P. A. Stott & N. A. Rayner,
2002: An observationally based estimate of the climate sensitivity, Journal
of Climate, 15(22), 3117–3121.
Hansen, J., G. Russel, A. Lacis, I. Fung & D. Rind, 1985: Climate response
times: Dependence on climate sensitivity and ocean mixing, Science, 229,
857–859.
Hansen, J. E., G. Russell, D. Rind, P. Stone, A. Lacis, S. Lebedeff, R. Ruedy
& L. Travis, 1983: Efficient three dimensional global models for climate
studies; models I and II, Monthly Weather Review, 3, 609–662.
Hegerl, G. C., T. J. Crowley, W. T. Hyde & D. J. Frame, 2006: Climate
sensitivity constrained by temperature reconstructions over the past seven
centuries, Nature, 440, 1029–1032.
Houghton, J. T., Y. Ding, D. J. Griggs, M. Noguer, P. J. V. D. Linden, X. Dai,
K. Maskell & C. A. Johnson, 2001: Climate Change 2001: Contribution of
Working Group I to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge University Press.
Kriegler, E., 2005: Imprecise probability analysis for integrated assessment of
climate change, Ph.D. Thesis, Potsdam University.
10
Manabe, S. & R. T. Wetherald, 1967: Thermal equilibrium of the atmosphere
with a given distribution of relative humidity, Journal of the Atmospheric
Sciences, 24(3), 241–259.
Meinshausen, M., 2006: What does a 2C target mean for greenhouse gas
concentrations? a brief analysis based on multi-gas emission pathways
and several climate sensitivity uncertainty estimates, in H. J. Schellnhu-
ber, editor, Avoiding dangerous climate change, chapter 28, Cambridge
University Press.
Morgan, M. G. & D. Keith, 1995: Subjective judgments by climate experts,
Env. Sci. Tech., 29, 468–476.
Webster, M. D. & A. P. Sokolov, 2002: A methodology for quantifying un-
certainty in climate projections, Climatic Change, 46(4), 417–446.
Wigley, T. M. L., C. M. Amman, B. D. Santer & S. B. Raper, 2005: Ef-
fect of climate sensitivity on the response to volcanic forcing, Journal of
Geophysical Research, 110(D09107).
Yohe, G., N. Andronova & M. Schlesinger, 2004: To hedge or not against an
uncertain climate future?, Science, 306, 416–417.
11
